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Abstract Recent empirical contributions emphasize the importance of (potential)
market size for the development of new pharmaceuticals. At the same time, many
scholars point out the importance of scientific advances for the industry’s R&D
activities. Against this background I analyze the relationship between (potential)
market size, technological opportunities, and the number of new pharmaceuticals in
the United States. Technological opportunities are operationalized as growth rates
of the relevant knowledge stock, as proposed by Andersen (Struct Chang Econ Dyn
9(1):5–34 1998, J Evol Econ 9(4):487–526 1999). I analyze a unique dataset by
using an “entry stock” Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator. The results
reveal a rather robust and significantly positive response of the number of new phar-
maceuticals, i.e., new molecular entities or new drug approvals, to market size and
technological opportunities.
Keywords Determinants of innovation · Pharmaceuticals · Demand · Technological
opportunities
JEL Classification O31 · J10 · J20 · L65
1 Introduction
There has been an extensive and long-running discussion as to whether demand- or
supply-side factors determine innovative activities across different industries. The
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controversy between advocates of the “demand-pull” and those of the “technology-
push” theories has been resolved by pointing out the importance of both the
information flows of scientific and technical knowledge and information from users
of products and processes for innovative activities (Freeman 1994). Consequently,
this paper studies the contribution of demand-side variables (market size) and supply-
side variables (technological opportunities) to innovative activities using data from
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. On the one hand, the importance of demand for
innovation in this sector has been pointed out by many scholars (e.g., Cerda 2007;
Acemoglu and Linn 2004). On the other hand, there is much evidence that innova-
tive activities in this sector rely on scientific advances, particularly in the field of
biotechnology (e.g., Rasmussen 2010; McKelvey 1996; Gambardella 1995). Hence,
the pharmaceutical industry provides an almost ideal case to analyze the importance
of demand- and supply-side variables for innovative output.
While researchers studying the determinants of innovation can apply a broad
range of usually quite well defined demand-side variables, some important supply-
side variables lack a clear definition or operationalization. In particular, the concept
of technological opportunities has been found to be a key variable for explaining
innovative activities across different industries, but there is no clear consensus con-
cerning its empirical approximation (e.g., Klevorick et al. 1995). Early studies of
the importance of technological opportunities relied mostly on industry dummies or
survey-based indicators of the importance of different knowledge sources. In contrast
to these contributions, I will use a quantitative proxy for technological opportunities,
following an idea proposed by Andersen (1998, 1999), and operationalize techno-
logical opportunities by the growth rate of the knowledge stock in a given field of
research.
The empirical analysis is performed on a unique dataset that encompasses
data from different sources. Data concerning new pharmaceuticals come from the
Drugs@FDA database. Cinical trials data are obtained from ClinicalTrials.gov. Mar-
ket size is constructed using the March Supplement of the U.S. Current Population
Survey and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).1 Publication data from
the Web of Science databases is used to construct proxies for technological oppor-
tunities. The data are analyzed using an “entry stock” Poisson quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator (QMLE), as suggested by Blundell et al. (1995), since it
accounts for dynamic feedback and unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the Poisson
QMLE is consistent under the assumption of a correctly specified mean and does not
require Poisson-distributed data.
The results indicate a significantly positive response of the number of new pharma-
ceuticals to market size. The positive response holds true for new molecular entities
as well as for new drug approvals and is fairly robust against different specifications
1This paper predominantly uses data from the U.S., one of the largest markets for pharmaceuticals in the
world. Many new pharmaceuticals introduced in the U.S. are marketed worldwide and approval decisions
in many countries are based on the corresponding decision by U.S. authorities (Kremer 2002). Never-
theless, one should be careful with drawing conclusions for the relationships in the world market for
pharmaceuticals.
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of the market size proxy. Technological opportunities have a significantly positive
relation with the number of new pharmaceuticals. However, the analysis does not
reveal a robust significant relation between technological opportunities in biotechnol-
ogy and basic research and the number of new pharmaceuticals. This result may be
driven by the construction of the database and the knowledge stocks, which may bet-
ter account for applied research. I take time lags of seven years into account, which
corresponds to the average time needed from the first clinical testing of a promising
compound to the approval of a new drug. The results suggest no clear-cut relationship
between lagged market size, lagged technological opportunities, and the number of
pharmaceutical innovations. By instrumenting market size by market size five years
previously, I find no evidence for reverse causality. The number of phase II and phase
III clinical trials, a proxy for new compounds under development, respond positively
to (potential) market size and to technological opportunities at the beginning of the
clinical research process.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the relationship
between demand and pharmaceutical innovation is often analyzed on a rather
aggregated level, e.g., drug categories or disease groups. Instead, I use a more disag-
gregated level of analysis, namely medical indications. Second, by operationalizing
technological opportunities as growth rates of knowledge stocks, I add a quantifi-
able proxy for this variable to the analysis. Third, the publication data used to
construct the knowledge stocks are more closely related to the definition of tech-
nological opportunities than are patents or other types of data previously used in
the literature. Particularly in a science-based industry such as pharmaceuticals, pub-
lications may reflect the possibilities for innovative activities more directly than,
e.g., patents, which can be seen as a realization of specific possibilities for inno-
vation. This interpretation is supported by a high number of citations from patents
to bio-pharmaceutical publications (cf., Narin and Olivastro 1992) indicating that
knowledge in scientific publications in this field of research may, on average, be more
basic, occur prior to patented knowledge, and may contain knowledge that cannot
be patented. Additionally, the number of approved drugs and the number of clinical
trials provide a more appropriate measure for the industry’s innovative activities as
compared to patent counts. Due to the specificities of the industry’s R&D process,
almost all promising compounds are patented before their therapeutic potential is
fully examined, but only few new compounds are approved for marketing, as the vast
majority usually do not meet expectations in terms of safety and efficacy. Hence, the
number of patents might considerably overestimate the number of successfully devel-
oped products. As a potential proxy for scientific and technological development,
patents face the problem that classification schemes are usually oriented towards
the chemical structure of compounds and not towards disease specific applications.
Moreover, the specific therapeutic use may not be fully determined when the patent
application is filed.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on the
demand- and supply-side determinants of innovative activities. Section 3 presents the
empirical strategy and Section 4 explains the construction of the variables and the
different data sources used. The empirical results can be found in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Related literature
2.1 Demand and innovation
The importance of demand in explaining the rate of innovation across sectors
has been recognized in economics for many decades. In his seminal contribution,
Schmookler (1966) suggests that cycles of capital good patents usually lag behind
cycles of capital goods’ output and capital expenditures in downstream industries.
This finding led to the conclusion that demand side stimuli are the most impor-
tant for explaining the rate and direction of inventive activities. Along with other
early contributions, these results have been criticized in the “demand-pull” versus
“technology-push” debate. The corresponding studies often lack a clear definition
of demand, neglect supply-side influences, and do not conclusively demonstrate the
importance of demand for the rate and direction of innovation (Mowery and Rosen-
berg 1979). Replications of Schmookler’s (1966) results have pointed to a somewhat
weaker relationship between demand and innovative activities than in the original
study. However, the relation remains significant in most cases (Scherer 1982). Fur-
thermore, there may be a mutual dependency between demand and innovation, rather
than a clear, unidirectional causality (Kleinknecht and Verspagen 1990).
Analyzing innovative activities in the United Kingdom, Geroski and Walters
(1995) find that variations in demand Granger-cause major innovation counts and
patents. Walsh (1984) offers a more differentiated view, by analyzing sub-sectors
of the chemical industry in more detail. The results suggest that exogenous major
innovations create their own demand, which subsequently leads to a rising num-
ber of incremental innovations. Thus, the importance of supply- and demand-side
influences may vary over a life cycle. In line with these results, Barge-Gil and
Lo´pez (2014) report that demand plays a more important role in shaping companies’
development rather than their research activities. In some industries, heterogeneous
demand as well as lead or experimental users play a dominant role in shaping the
rate and direction of technological development (Malerba et al. 2007; Adner and
Levinthal 2001; von Hippel 1976).
As to the pharmaceutical industry, it is often argued that demand-side variables
determine the rate and the direction of the industry’s investment in R&D activi-
ties and, consequently, the number of new drugs in different therapeutic categories.
Empirical evidence suggests that pharmaceutical companies’ R&D decisions are
determined by the expected return and cash flow variables, which should be con-
nected with the size of the corresponding markets and with real drug prices (Giaccotto
et al. 2005; Grabowski and Vernon 2000). Expected returns are an important determi-
nant of R&D spending not only for large U.S. but also for Japanese pharmaceutical
companies (Mahlich and Roediger-Schluga 2006). These results support earlier find-
ings, indicating that variables related to the expected returns explain chemical and
pharmaceutical firms’ R&D intensity (Grabowski 1968).
Following the empirical evidence on variables affected by market size shaping at
least partly firms’ R&D decisions, one would expect firms to invest in R&D and
to introduce new pharmaceuticals, particularly for medical conditions that have a
high expected market size and consequently, high expected returns. Consistent with
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this argumentation Fabrizio and Thomas (2012) provide evidence that pharmaceu-
tical companies’ innovation activities respond not only to worldwide sales but also
to those in their home countries. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) analyze the effect of
(potential) market size on new drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), making use of exogenous changes in the potential market size driven
by demographic trends. Their results indicate that a one percent increase in the poten-
tial market size of a drug category is associated with a four to six percent increase
in the entry of new molecular entities. The response as to new non-generic drugs is
approximately four percent. Moreover, their results show responses to five-year leads
in market size. Taking the time needed for development into account, pharmaceutical
R&D seems to respond to anticipated changes in the market size with a lead of 10 to
20 years. The results are robust against the introduction of controls for a variety of
supply-side factors.
Using U.S. demographical data, Cerda (2007) provides additional evidence for
the importance of market size for the introduction into the market of new molecular
entities. Moreover, the author shows that there are important feedback effects, since
new drugs affect the market size through their impact on the mortality rate. Market
size related variables affect not only the introduction of new molecular entities and
new non-generics, but also generic entry (Reiffen and Ward 2005; Morton 1999).
The importance of market size for the rate and direction of innovative activities
related to new drugs has been particularly emphasized regarding diseases that affect
individuals in developing countries. Small markets make it less attractive for pharma-
ceutical companies to engage in research and drug development for the corresponding
medical conditions and the appropriate delivery of medications in developing coun-
tries (Lichtenberg 2005a; Kremer 2002). Similar problems may occur regarding
rather rare diseases in developed countries. Supply-side incentives such as tax cred-
its may lead to an increase in innovative activities related to such medical conditions.
However, firms may still concentrate on the more prevalent conditions among the
rare diseases (Yin 2008).
2.2 Technological opportunities and innovation
The importance of demand-side variables has been contradicted by advocates of
the technology-push hypothesis, claiming that scientific and technological progress
are the primary drivers of the rate and direction of innovative activities. The gen-
eration of new scientific and technological knowledge leads to a steady renewal
of the pool of technological opportunities, i.e., an industry’s set of possibilities for
innovative activities (Klevorick et al. 1995). Technological opportunities reflect the
state of knowledge at a particular point in time, which determines the cost and
difficulty of successful innovative activities (cf., Jaffe 1986). Technological oppor-
tunities are bound to technological paradigms determining the scope of potential
innovations and the effort necessary to achieve these along specific trajectories. New
paradigms generate new opportunities for previously infeasible product development
and productivity increases. It is, however, the expected economic returns that lead to
dedicating resources to the exploitation of the existing opportunities (Dosi 1988).
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The theoretical contributions clearly indicate that technological opportunities are a
key factor in explaining (persistent) differences in innovative activities across indus-
tries (e.g., Nelson 1988). However, empirical investigations of this widely accepted
view turned out to be more difficult to conduct since there is no clear consensus con-
cerning the precise operationalization of the concept of technological opportunities
(Cohen and Levin 1989). Consequently, a broad variety of proxies for technological
opportunities has been used in empirical research. Many studies rely on industry cat-
egories or technology groups using different levels of aggregation. Although these
binary variables may capture more than mere differences in technological opportuni-
ties, they explain a considerable fraction of inter-industry and inter-firm differences
in innovative activities (e.g., Jaffe 1986, 1989a; Scherer 1965).
Other studies have relied on survey data addressing the sources of knowledge at
the firm or industry level, particularly the importance of various basic and applied
sciences for the industries’ technological change, as well as the contribution of exter-
nal knowledge sources, such as universities, suppliers, and customers (Barge-Gil and
Lo´pez 2014; Klevorick et al. 1995; Levin et al. 1987). These studies have found
that technological opportunities, particularly the closeness to science and extra-
industry sources of knowledge, positively affect innovative - particularly research as
opposed to development - activities and the rate of technical change (Barge-Gil and
Lo´pez 2014; Nelson and Wolff 1997; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen et al. 1987;
Levin et al. 1985). Another approach has used patent data to analyze technological
opportunities and their development. Andersen (1998, 1999) defines technological
opportunities as the growth of the stock of patents in different technology groups. The
analysis of technology dynamics reveals opportunity differences across technologies
and their changing sources over time.
The pharmaceutical industry is traditionally regarded as an industry with a rather
high level of technological opportunities. Particularly, the transformation from “ran-
dom screening” to a “guided drug discovery” process, and advances in molecular
biology and genetic engineering, have opened up new technological opportunities
(Galambos and Sturchio 1998; McKelvey 1996; Gambardella 1995). A broad vari-
ety of studies have illustrated the importance of scientific research, particularly that
conducted in universities and public research institutions, for the creation of new
knowledge. This new knowledge leads to the renewal and expansion of the available
set of technological opportunities. The set of technological opportunities itself builds
a foundation for the development of new pharmaceuticals (e.g., Cohen et al. 2002;
Klevorick et al. 1995; Mansfield 1991; Jaffe 1989b). In line with these results, public
research funding has been found to be another supply-side variable influencing the
introduction of new pharmaceuticals to the market, since it should translate into the
generation of new knowledge (Toole 2012).
Against this background, it seems rather surprising that supply-side variables, and
among them particularly the concept of technological opportunities, have received
relatively little attention from scholars analyzing innovative activities in the phar-
maceutical industry. Griliches et al. (1991) show that technological opportunities
linked to patent activity are positively related to the pharmaceutical industry’s
innovativeness. In order to control for different technological opportunities when ana-
lyzing the influence of organizational competence on firms’ research productivity,
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Henderson and Cockburn (1994) use dummy variables for therapeutic classes. While
clearly focusing on the (potential) market size as the main determinant of pharma-
ceutical innovation, Acemoglu and Linn (2004) use pre-existing trends in the number
of drug approvals to control for scientific opportunities across therapeutic categories.
Despite numerous theoretical arguments emphasizing the importance of techno-
logical opportunities for pharmaceutical innovation, difficulties with the operational-
ization of this concept may be one reason for the marked scarcity of empirical
evidence in the literature. By using growth rates of knowledge stocks as a proxy for
technological opportunities, as proposed in Andersen (1998, 1999), I will address
this shortcoming of the previous empirical literature.
3 Empirical strategy
The empirical analysis draws upon the literature concerning the “demand-pull” ver-
sus “technology-push” debate, and takes into account demand- and supply-side
factors as the explanatory variables for pharmaceutical innovation. This approach
goes beyond recent contributions to the field, which mainly concentrate on the
demand-side effects (e.g., Cerda 2007; Acemoglu and Linn 2004). Innovation is mea-
sured as the number of new drugs approved by the FDA over time.2 Hence, a Poisson
model for the conditional mean of new pharmaceuticals can be derived:
E [Nit |ζi, Xit ] = exp
(
β0 + β1 ln
(
MKSi,t−a
) + β2T Oi,t−b + βCi,t−c + ζi + μt
)
.
(1)
Here,Nit denotes the number of new pharmaceuticals for medical indication i in year
t , ζi represents time-constant medical indication intercepts capturing heterogeneity
among diseases, and Xit refers to all explanatory variables at t and earlier. More
precisely, MKSi,t−a accounts for the (potential) market size in i at t − a, T Oi,t−b
refers to the corresponding technological opportunities, Ci,t−c is a vector of control
variables, and μt is a set of dummy variables for each year included in the analysis
to capture common year specific effects.
Pharmaceutical innovation is a dynamic and non-linear process. Econometric
models used to analyze innovative activities in the drug industry have to take this
into account. More precisely, dynamic feedback can occur, since scientific break-
throughs in t may influence technological opportunities in t and subsequent years
and, hence, innovative output. Given the typical time structure of the industries’ R&D
and innovative activities, possible effects on innovation may occur around 12 years
after the original discovery, or even later. The presence of feedback processes vio-
lates the strict exogeneity assumption of conventional fixed or random effects panel
2The definition of innovation as a newly approved drug uses the specificities of the innovation process in
the pharmaceutical industry. After several phases of pre-clinical and clinical testing, a new drug has to be
approved by a regulatory body, the FDA in the United States, before being marketed (see, Gambardella
(Gambardella 1995)). This allows an identification of the number of new drugs approved for marketing in
a specific year. Additionally, the number of clinical trials in a specific phase can be used in a robustness
check as a proxy for the number of new compounds under development.
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estimators. Therefore, I follow Toole (2012) in applying an “entry stock” Poisson
QMLE, as suggested by Blundell et al. (1995), which accounts for feedback and
unobserved heterogeneity among medical indications. Monte Carlo simulations show
that this empirical approach performs quite well if the sample size is rather small
and the explanatory variables are highly persistent (Blundell et al. 2002). A high
level of persistence over time can be found particularly for the market size measures.
According to this approach, Eq. 1 can be transformed to
E
[
Nit |Nip,Mip, T Oip,Xit
] = exp(β0 + β1 ln (MKSit−a) + β2T Oi,t−b + βCi,t−c
+φNip + θMip + ρT Oip + μt ) , (2)
Different pre-sample variables are included in the analysis in order to consider
different sources of heterogeneity among medical indications such as the ease of
introducing drugs addressing a particular medical indication or the level of compe-
tition in the market as expressed by the number of competing drugs (Toole 2012).
More precisely, the pre-sample mean of new pharmaceuticals Nip has been included
to account for differences in innovative activites. Differences in the burden of disease
and in the technological opportunities may be additional sources of heterogeneity
across medical indications. These aspects are taken into account by including the
pre-sample prevalence of each medical indication i (Mip) as well as their pre-sample
technological opportunities (T Oip) into the analysis.
The Poisson QMLE is applied to a population average model in order to esti-
mate (2).3 The population average model accounts for correlations over time for
the medical indications included in the analysis (cf., Cameron and Trivedi 2013).
The Poisson QMLE is consistent under the assumption of the correct specification
of the conditional mean. This implies that the data need not be Poisson distributed
(cf., Gourieroux et al. 1984). Throughout the analysis, I use Huber–White robust
standard errors in order to account for the possibility of overdispersion and non
Poisson-distributed data.
4 Data and variable construction
4.1 Pharmaceutical innovation
Data on new drugs were obtained from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) using the Drugs@FDA database.4 Each record contains information on the
trade name of the drug, its generic name, the components that provide its pharma-
cological activity, its approval date, and a classification of the newness of the drug
formulation. I construct two different proxies for the number of innovations Nit . The
3This specification does not allow computation of traditional goodness of fit measures such as the Akaike
Information Criterion. The quasi-likelihood under the independence model criterion (QIC) provides an
alternative for Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood models (Pan 2001). Since it is not available for all
model specifications used throughout the analysis, the results are available on request.
4http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm135821.htm.
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first follows most of the literature on pharmaceutical innovation, by defining an inno-
vation as a new molecular entity (NME) (Cerda 2007; Grabowski and Wang 2006).
This measure refers to an active ingredient that has never been marketed before in
the United States. Second, I use the number of new drug approvals (NDA) as a
broader measure of pharmaceutical innovation. This proxy encompasses NMEs as
well as new chemicals derived from marketed active ingredients, new formulations
and dosages of already marketed ingredients, and new combinations of marketed
ingredients in the year of their approval by the FDA.5
The data on new drugs were matched with the diseases or medical indications
used in this paper based on their active ingredients which determine their therapeutic
use. Therefore, I follow Cerda (2007) in consulting the 19th edition of the Drug
Information Handbook published by Lexi-Comp and the American Pharmaceutical
Association (Lacy et al. 2010). This handbook is comparable to a pharmaceutical
dictionary, providing a list of drugs’ active ingredients, the medical conditions for
which the drug is used, and further information such as adverse effects. I take into
account only those medical conditions that can be found on the FDA approved label.
Hence, unlabeled and investigational uses are not taken into account. For the period
1974 to 2008, 530 unique NMEs and 1,484 unique NDAs had been approved by the
FDA in the 168 diseases or medical indications analyzed in this study. However, an
NME or NDAmay be used as therapy for several medical indications. In this case, an
NME or NDA is counted as an innovation for all the medical indications for which
it is approved. Figure 1 shows the number of unique NME and NDA throughout the
years included in the analysis.6
4.2 Clinical trials
New pharmaceuticals have to go through several phases of clinical testing before
they can be approved for marketing by the regulatory authorities. I make use of this
specificity of the pharmaceutical innovation process and use the number of phase II
and phase III clinical trials as an alternative indicator for innovative activities in a
robustness check. If market size and technological opportunities are related to the
number of new drugs, they should also be related to the number of clinical trials used
to test drug candidates. Although a single drug candidate is usually tested in sev-
eral clinical trials, the number of clinical trials might serve as a proxy of the number
of new drug candidates that might be approved for marketing in the future. Phase
II (Ph2T rialsit ) and phase III (Ph3T rialsit ) focus mainly on the effectiveness of
new compounds involving an increasingly larger number of more diverse test per-
sons over longer periods of time. During these phases, accurate profiles of the tested
5Kneller (2010) shows that that new drugs originate predominately in pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies. Notwithstanding the important role of knowledge generated in universities and public research
institutes for successful innovative activities in the pharmaceutical industry in general, academic institu-
tions play only a minor role as originators of new pharmaceuticals. Applications for market approval are
usually filed by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, too.
6Table 7 in the Appendix provides more descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
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Fig. 1 Number of NDA and NME per Year, Source: Drugs@FDA
drug candidates are developed, including dosages and adverse effects occurring with
small probabilities or after longer time periods. For a more detailed overview see,
Gambardella (1995).
The clinical trials data are collected from ClinicalTrials.gov, a comprehensive reg-
istry of clinical trials maintained by the United States National Library of Medicine
at the National Institutes of Health. It was established in 2000 and contains detailed
information on each clinical study including design of the study, the locations where
it is conducted, and the disease and condition that is addressed. Clinical trials listed
in the database are conducted in the U.S. and over 180 other countries. The condi-
tions specified in the clinical trials data have been used to match clinical trials with
the medical indications used in this paper. Concentrating on drug related clinical tri-
als that have been started during the years 2000 to 2008 I obtain 6,160 phase II and
4,622 phase III unique clinical trials.
4.3 Market size
Similar to related studies, market size is constructed based on demographic data using
population sizes in different age groups and individual income. In doing so, I link
market size to the potential purchasing power of individuals since a higher income
allows higher drug expenditures (cf., Cerda 2007; Acemoglu and Linn 2004). There
are two arguments for the use of demographic data in the construction of the mar-
ket size measure. First, drug consumption is likely to change with age. The elderly
may spend more on drugs than do younger individuals. However, it is very likely
that they are affected by different medical indications than younger members of the
population. Second, market size variations due to demographic changes are largely
exogenous to scientific achievements, the entry of new drugs, and the endogeneity
of market size and innovation (Acemoglu and Linn 2004). Therefore, market size
per medical indication is proxied by the sum of the purchasing power of five-year
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age groups a from 0–4 to 85+ for different medical indications, using appropriate
weights. More precisely, market size per medical indication i in year t is defined by
MKSit =
∑
a
ωiapopat incat . (3)
Here, ωia is a weight for medical indication i in age group a, popat is the total
population in age group a at t , and incat is the individual income of persons in age
group a in year t .
Following Acemoglu and Linn (2004), I compute ωia as the average share of
expenditure for drugs assigned to indication i divided by the total individual income
of individuals in age group a. To construct this proxy, I use data on drug expenditures
and income from the MEPS for the years 1996 to 1998.7 I use the 9th revision of the
International Classification of Diseases Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) published
by the National Center of Health Statistics to match the data on drug spending to the
medical indications included in this study. The weights are not time varying, in order
to rule out changes caused by new possibilities of diagnosing a disease, new phar-
maceuticals with which to treat it, and other causes of differences in the prevalence
rates.
Population sizes per age group and year (popat ) were obtained from the March
Supplement of the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS) provided by the Bureau of
the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPS monthly surveys the members
of about 50,000 households selected to represent the U.S. non-institutional popula-
tion. Each member of the surveyed households is assigned to its age group according
to the reported age. In addition to the demographic variables, the March Supplement
provides information about income. Individual income incat is proxied by the median
of the household income divided by the number of persons in the household. I use
this proxy instead of the reported individual income because the latter hardly allows
computing meaningful market size measures for those groups that have no or only
very little own-income, particularly children, students, and non-working spouses. The
income data are adjusted for inflation using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) for
all urban consumers provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The logarithms of
the market size measures are what enter into the regression analysis.
4.4 Technological opportunities
It is widely accepted in the literature on technological change that technological
opportunities play an important role in explaining differences in innovative activi-
ties across sectors and over time. However, there is no general consensus concerning
the precise definition of this theoretical concept, and particularly its empirical oper-
ationalization. Not surprisingly, empirical research has applied a broad variety of
indicators for technological opportunities, e.g., industry dummies, survey based mea-
sures on the sources of technical advance, and innovation expenditures as share of
total expenditures (e.g., Castellacci 2007; Becker and Peters 2000; Nelson and Wolff
7This is exactly the timespan used in Acemoglu and Linn (2004). Moreover, it is available for drug
expenditure data and for mortality data used as a robustness check.
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1997; Jaffe 1986; Levin et al. 1985). In this paper, I follow a different approach
as proposed by Andersen (1998, 1999) in which the rate of growth of a knowledge
stock serves as a proxy for the technological opportunities in a particular technol-
ogy area. Using this operationalization, high growth rates are associated with high
technological opportunities.
The knowledge stock consists of the scientific publications (Pubit ) related to
medical indication i and published in year t that are assigned to categories related to
pharmaceutical research. Publication data was obtained in the following way. A list
of 168 medical indications was drawn from the BioPharmInsight database.8 This list
encompasses all medical indications that have been available in this database and that
are not injuries or umbrella terms for several indications included in the list. Each
indication describes a condition or disease that allows of the development of a drug.
These medical indications were used to conduct a keyword search in the Web of Sci-
ence databases (WoS) in order to gather publication data. Publications that contain
at least one medical indication in the title have been taken into account. Moreover,
I restrict the sample to publications that are related to pharmaceutical research, i.e.,
that have been assigned to one of the categories “Biochemistry & Molecular Biol-
ogy”, “Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology”, “Chemistry, Applied”, “Chemistry,
Medicinal”, “Medicine, Research & Experimental”, “Pharmacology & Pharmacy”,
or “Toxicology”.9 I exclude all publications that are not labeled as journal arti-
cles. For the period from 1974 to 2008, I obtained 137,535 articles.10 Consequently,
the sample includes journal articles that refer to basic and clinical pharmaceutical
research. While it is evident that basic research articles reflect the development of
technological opportunities through basic research’s impact on the breadth and depth
of the state of knowledge, it might be less obvious to what extent clinical research
contributes to the development of technological opportunities. However, Azoulay
(2004) points out that knowledge production is a key aspect of clinical research
activities. Particularly early phase clinical research generates new knowledge since
it is dedicated to hypothesis generation and testing implying a contribution to the
development of technological opportunities.11
8Table 6 provides a list of medical indications and the corresponding therapeutic areas. The use of National
Drug Codes as in Acemoglu and Linn (2004) has not been possible since the FDA does not make Major
andMinor Drug Class codes available any more (FDA, 2011). The BioPharmInsight database can be found
at http://www.infinata.com/biopharma-solution/by-product/biopharm-insight.html.
9A description of these categories can be found athttp://ip-science.thomsonreuters.com/cgi-bin/jrnlst/
jlsubcatg.cgi?PC=D.
10Within the pharmaceutical industry articles in scientific journals are strongly connected to public and
private R&D efforts, since not only universities and public research institutes but also pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies engage in intense publication activities (Godin 1996; Narin and Rozek 1988).
11There may be concerns that the publication data are too narrowly defined due to the concentration
on publications related to pharmaceutical research. However, case studies comparing the technological
opportunities measures used in this paper and technological opportunities measures calculated based on
publications in all WoS categories reveal that both measures show a rather similar development. More-
over, the case studies reveal that the technological opportunities measure responds to scientific advances
related to a particular medical indication. For example, technological opportunities in the medical indi-
cation ”Hepatitis” increase considerably after the isolation of the Hepatitis C virus and advances in the
sequencing of the Hepatitis A virus’ genome by the end of the 1980s.
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Knowledge stocks are created using the perpetual inventory method. The basic
idea can be expressed as in Bitzer and Stephan (2007):
Kit = λ0Pubi,t + λ1Pubit−1 + · · · + λT Pubit−T with 0 < λ ≤ 1. (4)
Here, λ denotes the share of knowledge of the corresponding vintage that is still in
use, and T is the age of the oldest vintage of knowledge still used in t . Assuming
geometric depreciation of knowledge, Eq. 4 can be transformed into
Kit = Pubit + (1 − δ)Ki,t−1 with δ = λτ−1 − λτ
λτ−1
, (5)
where δ is the depreciation rate of the knowledge stock. Following previous work by
Cockburn and Henderson (2001), I set δ to 20%.
According to Andersen (1998, 1999), technological opportunities can be prox-
ied by the rate of growth of the knowledge stock. More formally, technological
opportunities can be expressed as
T Oit = Ki,t − Ki,t−1
Ki,t−1
∗ 100. (6)
4.5 Regulatory stringency
Since the vast majority of new drugs have to be approved by the regulatory authori-
ties, such as the FDA in the United States, the strictness of these authorities influences
the number of new drugs that are approved for marketing. Regulatory stringency(
ApprovalLengthj
)
is taken into account by calculating the average number of days
needed for FDA approval of a new drug in the therapeutic area j , i.e., a broader dis-
ease category to which a new drug belongs. More precisely, this is the average time
between the submission of a new drug approval to the FDA and its final approval
(cf., Grabowski et al. 1978). The data was obtained from the Drugs@FDA database
which contains information concerning the original drug application.
4.6 Pre-sample variables
Following the empirical strategy described in Section 3, pre-sample means were con-
structed in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity among medical indications.
The pre-sample mean of new pharmaceuticals
(
Nip
)
is the average number of NMEs
or NDAs approved by the FDA from 1940 to 1983 per year:
Nip =
∑T =1983
t=1940 Nit
T − t . (7)
Another source of unobserved heterogeneity may be differences in the prevalence
of medial indications. One may account for this aspect by introducing pre-sample
market size into the analysis. However, this strategy may bias the results, since
pre-sample market size is rather highly correlated with the market size variable.
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Therefore, I use the mortality rate per medical indication in 1983 to account for
differences in the pre-sample prevalence of medial indications:
Mip =
∑
a Deathit∑
a popat
∗ 100, 000 with t = 1983. (8)
Pre-sample technological opportunities are constructed as the average annual growth
rate of the knowledge stock from 1979 to 1983:
T Oip =
((
Kit=1983
Kit=1979
)1/5
− 1
)
∗ 100 (9)
5 Empirical results
5.1 Determinants of pharmaceutical innovation
Table 1 presents the results of the Poisson QML estimation without taking lagged
variables into account. In models (1) and (4), I analyze the relationship between
market size (MKSit ), technological opportunities (T Oit ), and the number of phar-
maceutical innovations, i.e., NMEit or NDAit . I find a positive and significant
response of the number of new drugs to market size. This result is robust against the
introduction of technological opportunities in models (3) and (6). Since market size
enters in logarithmic form, we can interpret the coefficient as an elasticity. Conse-
quently, the results presented in Table 1 suggest that a 1% increase in the market size
leads to an increase in the number of NME and in the number of NDA by approxi-
mately 0.3%. This is considerably smaller than found by some other studies. Some
of these studies use, however, more aggregated levels of analysis which may be a
reason for these differences. While this paper uses medical indications, Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) use broader categories of medications, e.g., antibiotics, that can be
used as treatments for several medical indications and find a response rate of 6% to
increases in the market size. Toole (2012) finds a range of the elasticity for market
size between 6.8 and 12.7 using six therapeutic markets each of which may include
several medical indications. In contrast to these studies, Cerda (2007) uses 15 differ-
ent drug categories to examines the effect of market size on the change in the stock
of drugs. The magnitude of logarithmic market size ranges from 0.11. to 0.46, which
is rather similar to the magnitude of coefficients for market size in this study.
As to technological opportunities, I find a positive and significant relation to NME
and NDA. The coefficient remains significant also in models (3) and (6), in which
the market size is included as well. These results suggest that the number of NME
and NDA responds not only to demand- but also supply-side variables. However, the
coefficient is rather small, which may be a consequence of the operationalization as
growth rates of knowledge stocks. Regulatory stringency (ApprovalLengthj ) is not
significantly related to the number of new pharmaceuticals. The estimates for pre-
sample mortality Mip do not indicate a significant relation to the number of NME
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Table 1 Determinants of pharmaceutical innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable NMEit NMEit NMEit NDAit NDAit NDAit
MKSit 0.3283*** 0.3322*** 0.3138*** 0.3163***
(0.0557) (0.0551) (0.0480) (0.0472)
T Oit 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ApprovalLengthj −0.0009* 0.0006 −0.0008 −0.0008* 0.0005 −0.0008*
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Mip 0.0028 0.0066*** 0.0031 −0.0031 0.0006 −0.0030
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031)
T Oip −0.0022 −0.0010 −0.0025 −0.0019 0.0008 −0.0019
(0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0061)
NMEip 0.5408*** 0.4094** 0.5456***
(0.1417) (0.1629) (0.1418)
NDAip 0.6349*** 0.4961*** 0.6397***
(0.1068) (0.1565) (0.1037)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −8.6394*** −3.1062*** −8.7496*** −7.2164*** −1.8144*** −7.2726***
(1.1232) (0.4714) (1.1059) (0.8619) (0.3644) (0.8491)
N 4200 3991 3991 4200 3991 3991
Indications 168 168 168 168 168 168
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
All market size measures enter in logarithmic form into the analysis
and NDA. Pre-sample technological opportunities T Oip show no significant effect
on NME or NDA.
Pre-sample drug innovations proxied by the average number of NME (NMEip)
and NDA (NDAip) prior to the analyzed period are positively and significantly
related to the number of new pharmaceuticals. This finding suggest that those med-
ical indications for which a high number of new drugs were introduced in the past
still appear attractive for innovation. Past innovations may indicate high profit mar-
gins, which make it attractive to introduce novelties in these markets to ensure
current and future profits. Another possible explanation may be that a large number
of past innovations shows that there has been a large amount of research in the cor-
responding medical indications, which may build the basis for later discoveries and
further exploitation of technological opportunities in subsequent years. The positive
response to pre-sample innovations contradicts the empirical evidence presented by
Toole (2012), who finds a negative response at a much more aggregated level.
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5.2 Time structure
So far, the analysis does not take into account the specific time structure of the inno-
vation process in the pharmaceutical industry. Subsequent to the discovery of a new
promising compound, a considerable period of time is needed in order to pass all
stages of pre-clinical and clinical testing and obtain regulatory approval. On aver-
age, it takes slightly more than 7.5 years from the first clinical testing to marketing
approval. The approval phase itself accounts for around 1.5 years out of this times-
pan. Before a new compound can enter clinical testing, researchers spend almost
five years on pre-clinical investigations. Hence, on average, it takes 12.5 years from
the discovery of a promising new compound to its approval (DiMasi and Grabowski
2007).
In Table 2, I use time lags in order to account for delays caused by the specificities
of the industry’s innovation process. More precisely, I introduce a time lag of seven
years to the market size (models (1), (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10)) and technological
opportunities variables (models (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), and (10)). This corresponds to
the time needed on average from clinical testing to approval.
Models (1), (5), (6) and (10) show a significant and positive relationship between
the lagged market size and the number of NME and NDA. In models (2) and (7),
in which contemporary and lagged market size are introduced simultaneously, the
coefficients of the lagged market size turn out to be negative. However, contemporary
and lagged market size are not significantly related to the number of NME and NDA
in this case. These findings may indicate that market size when the project started,
as well as the market size when the new drug is introduced to the market, play a role
in pharmaceutical R&D decisions. The positive results for lagged market size may
indicate that firms base their R&D decisions at least to some extent on forecasts of
the market size for the years in which they expect the new drug to enter the market.
However, the estimation results do not allow for any clear-cut conclusion as to which
market size measure dominates the decision.
Regarding technological opportunities, the results suggest differences between
NME and NDA. The coefficients of T Oit−7 are positive, but not significantly associ-
ated to the number of NME. With an exception in model (10) the results suggest that,
in case of NDA as dependent variable, contemporaneous and lagged technological
opportunities are significantly and positively related to the number of new pharma-
ceuticals. This finding may indicate that the development of NDA builds upon a
slightly different knowledge base than the more innovative NME. Past technological
opportunities seem to be less important for the development of the more innova-
tive NME. In general, the results for the control variables are comparable to those
presented in Table 1.
In order to account also for the pre-clinical phase, I use 12 year time lags for
market size and technological opportunities.12 The results are rather similar to those
presented in Table 2. However, lagged technological opportunities have a non-
significant coefficient. Hence, technological opportunities at the beginning of the
12The results can be found in Appendix.
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pre-clinical research phase are not significantly related to the number of NME and
NDA. A possible explanation for this finding may be found in the high uncertainty
accompanying pharmaceutical R&D. High technological opportunities at the begin-
ning of the pre-clinical research phase may lead to extensive exploration, but most
of the possible compounds do not obtain market approval. In contrast, a high level
of technological opportunities at the beginning of the clinical research phase may
enable pharmaceutical companies to improve promising compounds that may have a
higher probability of finally obtaining market approval.
5.3 Clinical trials
In order to examine further the robustness of the relationship between market size,
technological opportunities and new pharmaceuticals in the clinical phases of the
R&D process, I use the number of clinical trials in phase II and in phase III as depen-
dent variables. These dependent variables serve as proxies for the number of new
compounds under development. The focus on clinical testing requires different lag
structures as compared to the lags used in the regressions using NMEs and NDAs as
dependent variables. Following DiMasi and Grabowski (2007), drug candidates need
around one year on average to enter phase II clinical trials. Therefore, I use a time lag
of one year for market size and technological opportunities in the models in Table 3
in which the number of phase II clinical trials is the dependent variable. With respect
to phase III clinical trials, I use a time lag of three years for market size and techno-
logical opportunities. This time lag corresponds to the approximately three years of
clinical testing new compounds need on average to enter phase III clinical trials (see,
DiMasi and Grabowski 2007).
As in the previous regressions, the coefficients for market size and lagged mar-
ket size are positive and significant. Exceptions can be found in models (3) and (9)
in Table 3, in which market size is introduced together with lagged market size. The
results for contemporaneous technological opportunities do not indicate a robust sig-
nificant relation to the number of clinical trials. However, with an exception in model
(6), lagged technological opportunities are positively and significantly related to the
number of phase II and phase III clinical trials. These results suggest that the number
of clinical trials responds to both market size and (lagged) technological opportuni-
ties. Hence, supply side and demand side variables might increase the number of new
compounds that are tested and might be approved as new drugs in the future.
The results of the control variables differ partly from those obtained in the pre-
vious analyses. Regulatory stringency (ApprovalLengthj ) is positively related to
the number of phase III clinical trials. A possible explanation for this finding might
be that the regulatory authorities demand further phase III clinical tests during the
examination of new compounds. These additional clinical studies should provide fur-
ther evidence for the safety and efficacy of a new compound. In contrast, the number
of phase II clinical trials may be more directly influenced by demand and supply
side factors as indicated by the significant coefficients for the prevalence of medi-
cal indications and pre-sample technological opportunities. The pre-sample mean of
new drug approvals is positively related to phase II and phase III clinical trials. As
in the case for NMEs and NDAs, these findings may indicate that medial indications
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for which successful innovation took place in the past remain to be attractive and
profitable markets.
Although new drug approvals are related to clinical trials, since clinical testing
is a precondition for approval by the regulatory authorities, the number of clini-
cal trials may be influenced by different mechanisms than the number of approved
drugs. In order to account for this aspect I use pre-sample means for phase II as
well as for phase III clinical trials based on the years 2000 to 2002 to to account
for unobserved heterogeneity in the clinical research activities among different med-
ical indications. The corresponding results reveal a rather robust positive relationship
between (lagged) market size and the number of clinical trials. Furthermore, lagged
technological opportunities show a rather robust positive relationship to the num-
ber of phase II and phase III trials, whereas no robust positive relationship for
contemporary technological opportunities has been found.
5.4 Robustness checks
Table 4 presents several robustness checks. As pointed out by Acemoglu and Linn
(2004), changes in the insurance coverage of drug expenditures can be another
source of market size variation. In order to proxy drug expenditure coverage, I
multiply the market size measure by the fraction of privately insured persons in
age group a at time t , (insat ). The data were obtained from the Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey (MEPS), a large scale survey of U.S. families and individuals,
their medical providers, and employers. Equation 3 can be modified to ˜MKSit =∑
a ωiapopat incat insat . Models (1) and (7) present the regression analysis using
˜MKSit . The results are rather similar to the results presented above. As in Table 1, I
find a positive and significant response for NME and NDA to both market size and
technological opportunities. The results stay qualitatively the same if the insurance
coverage also encompasses other types of health insurance.
In models (2) and (8) in Table 4, market size is constructed using weights repre-
senting the average fraction of individuals dying due to a specific indication divided
by the total number of deaths in an age group for the years 1996 to 1998 (cf., Cerda
2007). Again, the weights are not time varying, in order to rule out changes in the
use of drugs for a certain medical indication due to price and quality changes as well
as the introduction of new pharmaceuticals. The data on multiple causes of death
in the United States were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System of the
National Center of Health Statistics. The results suggest a positive but not significant
relation between market size and the number of new pharmaceuticals. Technological
opportunities are again positively associated with the number of NME and NDA.
In (3) and (9), technological opportunities are constructed by only taking biotech-
nology publications into account. These are journal articles assigned to the categories
“Biochemistry & Molecular Biology” and “Biotechnology & Applied Microbiol-
ogy” in the WoS databases. Whereas the market size variable is still significantly
positive related to the number of NME and NDA in this setting, the coefficient
for technological opportunities is not significant. In models (4) and (10), I employ
only basic research articles to construct technological opportunities using the CHI
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classification of journals (Hamilton 2003). The CHI classification categorizes each
article according to the type of research prevalent in the journal in which it was pub-
lished. Taking only “basic biomedical research” into account, the response of the
number of new pharmaceuticals to market size remains significantly positive whereas
the coefficient for technological opportunities is not significant for NDA in model
(10). The non-significance of basic research and biotechnology-related technological
opportunities may be caused by the construction of the publication database. Since
a keyword search for medical indications was used, the data may capture mainly
applied research and only a few basic and biotechnology research papers building
the basis for new pharmaceuticals for several medical indications. In particular, the
data may not include new research methods that encompass a considerable amount of
innovation in biotechnology and may be more indirect in how they affect the number
of new pharmaceuticals. Moreover, the relevant knowledge stocks for basic research
may differ from the ones for more applied research.
In (5) and (11) I use a 10% depreciation rate of the knowledge stock when con-
structing the proxy for technological opportunities. The coefficients for technological
opportunities are positive and significant for NME and NDA. Hence, the technologi-
cal opportunities measure seems to be robust against changes in the depreciation rate.
Market size is still positively and significantly related to the number of new phar-
maceuticals. In regression models (6) and (12) I use a Poisson QML estimation with
fixed effects for medical indications. In these models, the market size measure is not
significant. This result is rather surprising but may be the consequence of the fixed
effects model. Since I run the analysis on a rather disaggregated level, there are a
considerable number of medical indications for which no NME or NDA was intro-
duced over the entire period of analysis. These indications are not taken into account
in the fixed effects estimation, and this may have consequences for the results. Nev-
ertheless, the proxy for technological opportunities is significantly positively related
to the number of NME and NDA. Moreover, the results presented in Table 1 are gen-
erally robust to the use of ten year age groups in the construction of the market size
proxy and linear depreciation of the knowledge stock over a five year period.
I account for the possibility that the relation between market size and the number
of new pharmaceuticals depends on the level of technological opportunities related
to specific medical indications by including interaction terms between market size
and technological opportunities into the analysis. The corresponding results do nei-
ther suggest a statistically significant interaction between contemporary market size
and contemporary technological opportunities nor a significant interaction between
lagged market size and lagged technological opportunities using lags of seven years.
Following Blundell et al. (1995) a dummy variable accounting for zero pre-sample
new pharmaceuticals for indication i has been included in the analysis. The cor-
responding results are qualitatively similar to to those presented above. However,
the technological opportunities measure loses its significance in the models using
NDAit as dependent variable when time lags of seven years and the zero pre-sample
new pharmaceuticals dummy are used.
There might be concerns that the subsample of publications containing a medical
indication in their title is too narrowly defined to account for the scientific develop-
ments that influence technological opportunities corresponding to specific medical
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indications. Therefore, I calculate technological opportunities based on an extended
sample of scientific publications in order to account for a broader set of indication-
specific research activities. More specifically, I calculate technological opportunities
using 828,280 publications that contain at least one medical indication in their title,
abstract, or keywords and that have been assigned to one of the categories listed in
Section 4.4. The corresponding results are qualitatively similar to those presented
above.
With respect to the computation of the technological opportunities measure, fur-
ther concerns may refer to the development of the number of relevant scientific
journals and their coverage by the WoS. The number of relevant scientific journals
has been growing over the past decades and the coverage of articles and journals by
the WoS may have changed over time, too. In addition, the information accessible
to researchers may have changed over time. For instance, the WoS claims to provide
searchable ”full-length, English-language author abstracts” for approximately 70%
of the articles from 1991 onwards. Consequently, there might be concerns that the
computation of the technological opportunities measure is influenced by changes in
the WoS database. In order to account for these changes in the database, in addition
to the use of year dummies in the regression analyses, I conduct a robustness check
taking only scientific articles published after 1991 into account to calculate the tech-
nological opportunities measure. The corresponding results are qualitatively similar
to those presented above.
Since the results may depend on the level of analysis, namely medical indica-
tions, a robustness check using the more aggregated level of therapeutic areas that
encompass several medical indications is conducted, too. The results are qualitatively
similar to the results on the medical indication level.
A further concern might be that larger markets attract more public or private
research, generating higher technological opportunities. One may check for these
feedback effects by taking only rare diseases into account, since there are only a
few market incentives to develop medications for them. However, the number of rare
diseases in the sample is quite small and the corresponding Poisson models do not
converge. Moreover, one may think about differences in the relationship between
market size and pharmaceutical innovation between the U.S. and other important
markets such as Europe and Japan. However, detailed data on drug spendings, pop-
ulation numbers per age group, and the number of new drugs corresponding to the
indications in order to address this issue have not been available to the author.
5.5 Reverse causality
As pointed out by Kleinknecht and Verspagen (1990), there may be a mutual depen-
dency between market size and innovation instead of a unidirectional causality.
Particularly in the pharmaceuticals industry, new products may introduce the poten-
tial for reverse causality. Lichtenberg (2004, 2005b) shows that new drugs contributed
to the longevity increase observed in many countries over the past few decades.
Hence, through their impact on consumers’ life expectancy, new drugs lead to an
endogenous growth of pharmaceutical markets (Cerda 2007). However, Acemoglu
and Linn (2004) argue that the drug-induced changes in the population sizes are quite
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small relative to overall demographic changes. Nevertheless, they propose a strategy
to address this issue. Following their approach, I instrument current market size by
the corresponding market size five years earlier. More precisely, I use the size and
income of those 70–74 years old in 1984 to instrument for population size and income
of those 75–79 years old in 1989. The population size and the income of those 70–74
years old is highly correlated with the size and the income of those 75–79 years old
five years later, but it is unaffected by new pharmaceuticals that were approved in the
meantime.
In the empirical analysis of this instrumental-variable I use a Generalized Methods
of Moments (GMM) estimator for the pooled Poisson regression. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 1000 replications and clustered on the indication level. The results
are presented in Table 5. These results are quite similar to the baseline results in
Table 1. The number of new NME and NDA responds positively to market size. How-
ever, the coefficients for technological opportunities are not statistically significant.
Table 5 Determinants of pharmaceutical innovation GMM estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable NMEit NMEit NDAit NDAit
MKSit 0.2451*** 0.2502*** 0.1915*** 0.2063***
(0.0609) (0.0685) (0.0589) (0.0599)
T Oit 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0052) (0.0014)
ApprovalLengthj −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Mip −0.0002 0.0011 −0.0031 −0.0023
(0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0036) (0.0037)
T Oip −0.0029 −0.0029 −0.0022 −0.0027
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0069) (0.0070)
NMEip 1.0656*** 1.0557***
(0.2585) (0.2656)
NDAip 1.3572*** 1.3190***
(0.1951) (0.1904)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −7.4008*** −7.4919*** −6.0008*** −6.2739***
(1.0537) (1.1546) (1.0407) (1.0221)
N 4200 3991 4200 3991
Indications 168 168 168 168
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
All market size measures enter in logarithmic form into the analysis
Market size is instrumented with market size of the same age
cohort five years earlier
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Consequently, I find no evidence that the problem of reverse causality arises in the
analysis.
6 Conclusion
Recent empirical contributions have stressed the importance of the (potential) market
size for the development of new pharmaceuticals. At the same time, many scholars
have emphasized the changes in the industry’s R&D process, from “random screen-
ing” to “guided drug development”, and have pointed to the importance of advances
in molecular biology and related fields for the industry’s technological opportunities
and innovative capabilities. Against this background, I have analyzed the relation-
ships between (potential) market size, technological opportunities, and the number
of new pharmaceuticals in the United States. This empirical analysis is based on
a unique dataset combining data from different sources. In the analysis, I use an
“entry stock” Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE), as suggested
by Blundell et al. (1995).
The empirical estimates reveal a significantly positive response of the number of
new pharmaceuticals, i.e., new molecular entities or new drug approvals, to market
size and technological opportunities. Similar results are obtained when the depen-
dent variable is the number of phase II or phase III clinical trials. In the robustness
checks, the market size measures lose significance when mortality data is used in its
construction and when the PQML fixed effects model is used. As a further robustness
check, I constructed the technological opportunities proxy by taking only biotech-
nology or basic research publications into account. The results from this indicated
no significantly robust positive relation between these two variants of the technolog-
ical opportunities measure and the number of new pharmaceuticals. When taking the
specific time structure of the pharmaceutical R&D process into account by including
time lags of seven years into the analysis, I found no clear-cut relationship between
lagged market size, lagged technological opportunities, and the number of new phar-
maceuticals. The results stay qualitatively similar if broader therapeutic areas instead
of medical indications are used as a unit of analysis.
Overall, the results suggest a quite robust and significantly positive relation
between the (potential) market size and the number of new pharmaceuticals, as well
as between (potential) market size and the number of clinical trials. These results are
in line with recent contributions by Cerda (2007) and Acemoglu and Linn (2004).
I found no evidence of a reverse causality between market size and the number
of new pharmaceuticals. Regarding technological opportunities, I found a signifi-
cantly positive relation with the number of new drugs. Technological opportunities
at the beginning of the clinical development phase are positively related to the num-
ber of phase II and phase III clinical trials. These results support earlier studies
indicating the importance of technological opportunities in themselves and the scien-
tific progress, which is an important source of new opportunities for pharmaceutical
innovation (e.g., Toole 2012; Lim 2004; Griliches et al. 1991). Nevertheless, the
results for technological opportunities need further analysis of the role of advances
in biotechnology and basic research for the development of new pharmaceuticals.
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Since my results suggest that the (potential) market size influences the rate and
direction of innovative activities in pharmaceuticals, policy makers can support the
development of drugs for medical indications with small markets through incentive
creating programs, e.g., tax credits. Nevertheless, these programs have to take into
account the fact that private R&D investment is rather concentrated in the bigger
markets among the small ones (Yin 2008). The empirical analysis suggests that tech-
nological opportunities are positively related to the number of clinical trials as well
as to the number of new pharmaceuticals. These results indicate that supply side
policies can provide another promising way to stimulate the development of new
pharmaceuticals and new compounds. Public funding and other support of scien-
tific research directed to certain diseases can lead to the generation of new scientific
knowledge, contributing to a renewal of the technological opportunities. The latter
can be seen as a set of possibilities from which new drugs can be developed. As a con-
sequence, the number of promising compounds may increase and translate into new
pharmaceuticals after the different stages of clinical research. This process of gener-
ating new technological opportunities and translating these into new pharmaceuticals
may, however, be time consuming. Following DiMasi and Grabowski (2007), drug
development takes on average more than 12 years from the discovery of a promising
compound to market approval. Taking the generation of new technological opportu-
nities into account, the lag between public research funding and market approval may
be close to the 17 and 24 years, as suggested by Toole (2012). Hence, public research
support has to have a long-term orientation.
As shown in previous studies, public investments in pharmaceutical research
can have important indirect effects increasing the industry’s innovative activities
through the stimulation of private R&D investment (Toole 2007). Recommenda-
tions concerning the support of different research types to increase the number of
new pharmaceuticals need further evaluations of the role of biotechnology and basic
research. However, research addressing the mechanism of action of drugs and the
causes of diseases might be promising, since both are not yet fully understood.
Increased knowledge in these areas may help to discover and to synthesize new com-
pounds with improved safety and efficacy. These quality improvements may help to
reduce the cost of the clinical phases of the pharmaceutical R&D process. Regarding
regulatory stringency, the empirical analysis does not suggest that reductions in this
stringency would be an appropriate method for spurring pharmaceutical innovation.
Acknowledgements I am grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financial support
(DFG GKR 1411). I thank Uwe Cantner, Matthew J. Higgins, Ivan Savin, Simon Wiederhold, the partici-
pants of the Research Seminar at the Institute for Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Gothenburg, Sweden
on February the 3rd 2012, the participants of the DRUID Society Conference 2012 in Copenhagen, Den-
mark, the participants of the 14th ISS Conference in Brisbane, Australia, the participants of the Annual
Congress of the Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik 2012 in Go¨ttingen, Germany and two anonymous reviewers for
useful comments, expressed interest and concerns. The usual caveats apply.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interests The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
720 B. Rake
Appendix
A.1 List of medical indications
Table 6 List of medical indications, source: BioPharmInsight
Therapeutic Area Indications
Cancer Bladder Cancer, Bone Cancer, Brain Cancer, Breast Cancer, Cervical
Cancer, Colon Cancer, Gastrointestinal Cancer, Head and Neck Can-
cer, Kidney Cancer, Leukemia, Liver Cancer, Lung Cancer, Lymphoma,
Melanoma, Mucositis, Multiple Myeloma, Non Hodgkins Lymphoma,
Ovarian Cancer, Pancreatic Cancer, Soft Tissue Sarcoma
Cardiovascular Diseases Acute Coronary Syndrome, Angina, Arrhythmias, Atherosclero-
sis, Cardiovascular Disease, Heart Failure, Hypertension, Hypoxia,
Myocardial Infarction, Myocardial Ischemia, Stroke, Thrombosis
Central Nervous System Alcohol & Drug Dependence, Alzheimer’s Disease, Ataxia, Autism,
Bipolar Disorder, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, CNS Disorders, Demen-
tia, Eating Disorders, Epilepsy, Huntington’s Disease, Insomnia, Mad
Cow Disease, Multiple Sclerosis, Narcolepsy, Neurodegenerative Dis-
eases, Neuropathies, Parkinson’s Disease, Restless Leg Syndrome,
Schizophrenia, Seizures & Spasms, Sleep Apnea, Spinal Cord Injuries
Dermatology Acne, Dermatitis, Psoriasis, Rosacea
Eye and Ear Cataracts, Dry Eye, Glaucoma,Macular Degeneration, Macular Edema,
Otitis Media, Retinopathy, Uveitis
Gastrointestinal Colitis, Constipation, Crohn’s Disease, Diarrhea, Inflammatory Bowel
Disease, Irritable Bowel Syndrome, Liver Disease, Obesity, Short
Bowel Syndrome, Ulcers
Genitourinary Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, Endometriosis, Incontinence, Overac-
tive Bladder, Polycystic Ovarian Disease, Prostate Related Diseases,
Prostatitis, Sexual Dysfunction, Urethritis, Uterine Fibroids
Hematological Anemia, Coagulation, Hemophilia, Iron Overload, Sickle Cell Anemia
& Thalassemia, Thrombocytopenia, von Willebrand Factor
Hormonal Systems Acromegaly, Diabetes, Diabetic Nephropathy, Gaucher’s Disease,
Hormonal Systems, Hyperlipidemia & Dyslipidemia, Hyperparathy-
roidism, Hyponatremia, Hypothyroidism, Kidney Disease, Menopause,
Metabolic Conditions, Mucopolysaccharidoses, Nephritis, Pompe’s
Disease, Thyroid Disease
Immune System Allergies, Amyloidosis, Autoimmune Diseases, Canker Sores, Graft-
versus-host Disease, Inflammatory Diseases, Lupus, Periodontal Disease
Infectious Diseases Bacterial Vaginosis, Candidiasis, Cytomegalovirus Infections, Diph-
theria & Pertussis & Tetanus, Escherichia Coli, Encephalitis, Fun-
gal Infections, Genital Herpes, Gram-negative Infections, Gram-
positive Infections, Hepatitis, Herpes, Impetigo, (Other) Infectious
Diseases, Influenza, Malaria, Measles & Mumps & Rubella, Menin-
gitis, Mononucleosis, Mycobacterium Avium Complex, Pharyngitis,
Pneumonia, Poisoning, Respiratory Infections, Rotavirus Infections,
Respiratory Syncytial Virus Diseases, Sepsis, Septic Shock, Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Tonsilli-
tis, Tuberculosis, Urinary Tract Infections
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Table 6 (continued)
Therapeutic Area Indications
Musculoskeletal Ankylosing Spondylitis, Arthritis, Muscular Dystrophy, Osteoarthritis,
Osteoporosis, Paget’s Disease, Rheumatoid Arthritis
Pain Migraine & Headache, Pain
Respiratory Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome, Asthma, Bronchitis, Chronic
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, Cystic Fibrosis, Emphysema, Respira-
tory, Sinusitis
A.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 7 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
NMEit overall 0.1557 0.4547 0.0000 5.0000 N 4200
between 0.2124 0.0000 1.8800 n 168
within 0.4024 −1.7243 3.2757 T 25
NDAit overall 0.5557 1.1389 0.0000 12.0000 N 4200
between 0.7365 0.0000 4.7600 n 168
within 0.8706 −3.2043 11.3557 T 25
Ph2T rialsit overall 3.2368 7.9443 0.0000 78.0000 N 1512
between 7.1187 0.0000 52.1111 n 168
within 3.5645 −25.2077 43.3479 T 9
Ph3T rialsit overall 2.4537 5.8684 0.0000 78.0000 N 1512
between 4.8894 0.0000 41.2222 n 168
within 3.2649 −33.7685 39.2315 T 9
MKSit overall 18.2070 1.9863 10.8872 23.2560 N 4200
between 1.9845 11.2216 22.9477 n 168
within 0.1733 17.6938 18.8297 T 25
T Oit overall 14.7410 187.6144 −20.0000 9074.9480 N 3991
between 45.2071 −20.0000 487.9656 n 168
within 183.1949 −493.2246 8601.7240 T-bar 23.756
ApprovalLengthj overall 546.8478 145.6267 307.8000 780.1364 N 4200
between 146.0446 307.8000 780.1364 n 168
within 0.0000 546.8478 546.8478 T 25
Mip overall 5.8228 19.5655 0.0004 127.0060 N 4200
between 19.6217 0.0004 127.0060 n 168
within 0.0000 5.8228 5.8228 T 25
T Oip overall 8.8835 13.1197 −16.3488 96.4633 N 4200
between 13.1574 −16.3488 96.4633 n 168
within 0.0000 8.8835 8.8835 T 25
722 B. Rake
Table 7 (continued)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
NMEip overall 0.6816 0.6761 0.0000 6.0000 N 4200
between 0.6781 0.0000 6.0000 n 168
within 0.0000 0.6816 0.6816 T 25
NDAip overall 0.8786 0.7648 0.0000 6.0000 N 4200
between 0.7670 0.0000 6.0000 n 168
within 0.0000 0.8786 0.8786 T 25
Table 8 Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) MKSit 1.0000
(2) T Oit -0.0363* 1.0000
(3) ApprovalLengthj 0.2805*** −0.0282 1.0000
(4) Mip 0.2022*** −0.0058 0.1625*** 1.0000
(5) T Oip 0.1047*** −0.0501** 0.0467** 0.0323* 1.0000
(6) NMEip 0.0928*** −0.0315* −0.0339* 0.0279 0.0778*** 1.0000
(7) NDAip 0.1664*** −0.0274 −0.0230 −0.0174 0.0673*** 0.9028*** 1.0000
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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